We develop a theory of program specification using the notion of refinement type. This provides a notion of structured specification, useful for verification and program development. We axiomatise the satisfaction of specifications by programs as a generalised typing relation and give rules for refining specifications. A per semantics based on Henkin models is given, for which the system is proven to be sound and complete.
INTRODUCTION
We address the question of what is a suitable notion of specification for a programming language, where the properties of interest can be expressed using some given program logic. In particular, we restrict our attention to those languages which can be studied using typed lambda calculi, that is, typed functional programming languages.
A number of possibilities can be considered. One is to say that a specification is a type in some expressive type theory. This is the approach taken by Luo (1991) for example. An integer square root function might be specified as the existential type 9f : nat ! nat : (f n) 2 = n _ (f n) 2 + 1 = n, where the logic is encoded in the type theory. The problem is that this only works for an intuitionistic logic. Classical logics are more common for specification, and cannot easily be encoded in type theories. Also, programming languages generally have a simple type system of their own, and this must somehow be related to the specification type theory.
Another possibility is to say that a specification is just a proposition of the program logic with a distinguished free variable. Our square root example would be the proposition (f n) 2 = n _ (f n) 2 + 1 = n, where f is a free variable of type nat ! nat. This is the approach traditionally taken by the program refinement community, and Morgan (1994) describes a refinement calculus based on the use of first-order predicate logic.
However, this approach has a number of shortcomings, which we illustrate with an example below. The main point is that for compositional verification and program development it is better to put more structure on specifications.
In this paper, we suggest a third possibility, a combination of the program logic with the type theory of the programming language known as refinement types. The notion of refinement type has been studied extensively in program analysis (under different names) and there are many different systems, depending on the area of interest. The general idea is to have two levels -an underlying level of program types, and a more expressive level of program properties, which are then treated like types. For us, this more expressive level will be the specifications. Hence we can exploit type-theoretic structure in our specifications, but do not need to do any encoding.
We describe a verification calculus based on the simply-typed lambda calculus with products ( ! ) and some ground types such as nat and bool. The satisfaction of specifications by programs is axiomatised as a generalised typing relation. We do this by viewing specifications as refinements of an underlying type, expressed using the program logic. We use typed classical predicate logic as program logic here, and axiomatise an ordering on the refinement types, to be viewed as an increase in information, or refinement of specifications. We give a simple set-theoretic interpretation of the calculus. The main result of the paper is soundness and completeness with respect to this class of models. In Section 2 we consider a simple example of specifying and verifying a program in order to motivate the features of our calculus. We then give the syntax and rules of the calculus in Section 3. In Section 4 we return to the example. Section 5 gives the semantics and proofs of soundness and completeness. Finally, we make some conclusions in Section 6.
Related Work
There have been a number of papers in the 'non-standard type system as program logic' paradigm. Nielson & Nielson (1988) and (Burn 1992) axiomatise consequence relations on properties as a form of refinement. Pfenning, who introduced the term "refinement type", used them to express properties of mini-ML programs (Freeman & Pfenning 1991) .
There have been various approaches by type theorists to combining logic and types. Feferman's (1985) system of variable types extends ! with subset types, though equality does not depend on the type, as it does here. Refinement can be defined in the logic, and is not explicitly axiomatised. Other type-theoretic approaches include (Aspinall 1995 , Aspinall & Compagnoni 1996 , which differ from the present work in being concerned with subtyping type families. Dependency there is at the level of types themselves, whereas we only allow dependent structure at the refinement type level.
The deliverables approach (Burstall & McKinna 1992 , McKinna 1992 ) is to consider a program paired with its proof of correctness. We are similarly mo tivated in wanting to structure specifications using program types, but differ in taking proof existence as more important than the proof itself -terms do not need an explicit witness to satisfy a refinement type. Our calculus could be regarded as an internal language for deliverables.
The work of Luo (1991) presents an encoding of specifications and 'specification morphisms' (corresponding to our terms) in an expressive type theory. Our work provides a more direct analysis of the concept of specification. The existential form of Martin-Löf's type theory with subset types in (Nordström, Petersson & Smith 1990 ) is similar. The work of Hayashi (1994) is also related.
The program refinement community has traditionally used unstructured specifications. For example, Morgan (1994) describes a refinement calculus based on the use of propositions of first order predicate logic.
EXAMPLE
Let us consider specifying division by 2 on the naturals and verifying that a program satisfies the specification. We will take the simply-typed lambda calculus and classical first-order predicate logic as simple programming and specification languages respectively. We will use an applied ! theory extended with a constant for iteration over the naturals, where natiter z f n computes the n-th iterate f n (z).
As a first approximation to specifications we use propositions with a distinguished free variable, which we write as (x : )P where is the type of the variable x in proposition P.
A program div2 which implements division on the naturals is div2 = n : nat : 1 (div2 0 n) : nat ! nat where this uses the auxiliary function div2 0 = natiter h0; 0i ( p : nat nat : h 2 p; 1 p + 1i) Now this can be specified as div2 spec = (f : nat ! nat) 8n : nat : n = 2 f(n) _ n = 2 f(n) + 1
We want to axiomatise a satisfaction relation sat between programs (closed terms) and specifications, so that we can prove div2 sat div2 spec One simple way of doing this is to say that t sat (x : )P is just taken to be a notation for a typing and a proposition, with the rule that t sat (x : )P when t : and P t=x]. This example reduces then to proving 8n : nat : n = 2 div2(n) _ n = 2 div2(n) + 1 Now, our specification language is rather cumbersome as it stands, so let us introduce dependent products and functions as abbreviations x:(x: )P (y : )Q for (z :
)P 1 z=x]^Q 1 z=x; 2 z=y] x:(x: )P (y : )Q for (f : ! )8x : : P Q fx=y]
The dependent function x:(x: )P (y : )Q specifies some function which for all x : such that P, returns a y : such that Q. This has combined the two quantifications in (f : ! )8x : : P Q fx=y], which we read as some f : ! such that for all x : , if P then Q fx=y]. If we allow ourself the further abbreviation of viewing types as trivial specifications, so that for example, nat can stand for (x : nat)true, then we can write our specification more compactly as div2 spec = n:nat (m : nat)n = 2 m _ n = 2 m + 1 Now, using our abbreviations, the following rule is admissible from our definition of sat n : nat` 1 (div2 0 n) sat (m : nat)n = 2 m _ n = 2 m + 1 n : nat: 1 (div2 0 n) sat n:nat (m : nat)n = 2 m _ n = 2 m + 1 where we understand the sequent n : nat`t sat to mean for all closed t 0 : nat, t t 0 =n] sat t 0 =n]. In general then, we want to consider satisfaction in an arbitrary context. Note the similarity to a typing rule. In fact, not only are and useful structuring devices for specifications, they are also useful for proofs, as specifications of programs often tend to be most naturally expressed and proved in a 'shape' similar to the program.
For example, the program div2 is an abstraction and the specification div2 spec is of the form x: . The rule directly reflects a natural proof that div2 satisfies div2 spec. Similarly, the auxiliary function div2 0 has specification div2 0 spec = n:nat (m:nat)n=2m_n=2m+1 (m 0 : nat)m + m 0 = n The proof of this, in turn, involves showing that a pair satisfies a product specification, and an abstraction satisfies a functional specification (as above). We also have to use induction to show that an iteration satisfies some specification parameterised on the naturals. We consider this example more fully in Section 4.
A significant benefit in writing specification in this more structured form is conceptual -it is preferable to structure specifications in such a way that it aids understanding of both specification and program. Then the task of comprehension need not be duplicated unnecessarily for specification and program. Also, separate checks of well-formedness (i.e. type-checking here) and correctness, will involve some duplication of effort, so it is better to combine types and correctness properties. Though we will not consider it here, in order to be the basis of a useful program development methodology, it helps for our specifications and proofs to reflect the structure of the programs. We do not throw away the original rule that t satisfies (x : )P when t : and P t=x], however, since not all specifications can be given in a structured form.
There is one final aspect of specifications which we must consider -equality. The kind of specifications with which we are concerned here are those which specify the input-output characteristics of programs. We are only interested in programs up to extensional equality. The alternative, in a type-theoretic setting, is to use an intensional equality and distinguish programs on the basis of syntactic form. This would be unnatural here however, so we view specifications as coming equipped with a partial equivalence relation (per), which acts as an equality. A per is a symmetric and transitive relation on the set of terms at the type, or equivalently, an equivalence relation on a subset of terms at the type.
For example, the specification l:nonemptylist (n : nat)Min(n; l) where the proposition Min(n; l) says that n is the minimum element in list l, is a refinement type over type list ! nat. We want to regard functions f; f 0 : list ! nat as equal solutions of this specification if they give the same results for nonempty lists. Any program satisfying this specification must be defined on the empty list, but we are not interested in the value it takes there. Now, we would attain some conceptual simplicity if specifications were to subsume types, satisfaction to subsume typing, and equality at a specification to subsume the usual equality at a type (which is often left implicit). For example, we use (n : nat)true in place of nat, and n:(n:nat)true (b : bool)true for nat bool.
At this point, we must cease to regard x:(x: )P (y : )Q as an abbreviation, since we want it to have a different equality from (f : ! )8x : : P Q fx=y].
We believe it is misleading to regard specifications as types, though, and refer to the specifications of this idealised specification language as refinement types. Equality is given by a per over the underlying type.
A specification therefore, is a refinement type, and consists of a type , together with a per over . We take a program in this calculus to be an equivalence class of a per . The alternative would be to take a program as an element of the domain of a per, but this would be unnatural because we would then be distinguishing programs beyond extensional equality.
We use a notation for the equivalence classes of pers, by allowing refinement types on the variables in abstractions. For example, n : even:n is a class in the per even ! nat but not nat ! nat, and n : nat:n is a class in both even ! nat and nat ! nat. The equality t = t 0 says that t and t 0 are the same equivalence class of per .
For refinement types and 0 over the same underlying type, we want to consider refinements v 0 , to be though of semantically as per inclusion (i.e. equality at 0 implies equality at ). We use the square v symbol to indicate an information
ordering -the refinement of specifications. Note that this convention for refinement is the opposite direction to the usual subtyping relation.
THE CALCULUS

Syntax
The idea is that we construct a theory of refinement types on top of an underlying ! theory and a first-order logic theory. This is generated from a signature of types, constants and predicate symbols (in the underlying theory) and axioms (in the full theory). The well-formedness conditions on axioms will be explained in Section 3.3 below. 
The raw expressions of the language are given by a mutual recursion over refinement types, terms, propositions and contexts :
::= 1 j j x: 0 j x: 0 j (x : )P t ::= x j k(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) j j ht; t 0 i j x : :t j i (t) j tt 0 P ::= false j P P 0 j 8x : :P j F(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) j t = t 0 j v 0 ? ::= hi j ?; x : j ?; P Conceptually, it is simpler not to distinguish types and refinement types as syntactic categories. Refinement types should be viewed as being refinements of underlying types, so for example, if is a refinement of (we will just say 'over') , and is over , then x: is over . Formally however, types are just refinement types with no logical information, that is, not containing any propositions. We use and as metavariables for types.
There is a unique (up to equality) term of unit type 1. The meaning of the other refinement types in terms of satisfaction is that ht; t 0 i satisfies x: when t satisfies and t 0 satisfies t=x]; term t satisfies x: when for every t 0 satisfying , tt 0 is well-formed and satisfies t 0 =x]; and t satisfies (x : )P when it satisfies and the proposition P t=x] holds.
We think of terms of the calculus as being simple specifications of terms in the underlying ! . We will refer to terms of ! as total terms. Terms of the calculus uniquely specify total terms up to equality at some refinement type. Terms have their usual meaning in the lambda calculus, except that an abstraction x : :t should be thought of as a simple specification of terms x : :t 0 such that for all t 00 which satisfy , t 0 t 00 =x] satisfies t t 00 =x].
For example, n : even:n specifies total terms of type nat ! nat which are the identity on even arguments. The application ( x : :t)t 00 is only well-formed for arguments t 00 which satisfy so behaviour outwith is not constrained. Note that this means that although even ! even is a refinement of the type nat ! nat, the term n : even:n does not itself have type nat ! nat. Intuitively, we can say that a term t has refinement type if its behaviour 'at ' is uniquely determined, that is, any two total terms which satisfy t are themselves equal at .
Remark 2 Our choice of first-order classical logic is only significant insofar as it is an example of what we might call an extensional logic. We make essential use of the fact that for all terms t, t 0 and propositions P, if t is extensionally equal to t 0 (which, in general, may coincide with the equality of the logic, if it has one, but otherwise can be defined as a logical relation), then P t=x] holds if and only if P t 0 =x] does. In other words, we require Leibniz and observational equality to coincide. It does not matter whether the logic is classical or intuitionistic.
This can be contrasted with, say, the use of an intensional logic such as the modal -calculus, where terms are viewed as transition systems through their reduction sequences.
Judgements
The judgements of the calculus are ?`t :
?`P 
Rules of the Calculus
Rather than give an exhaustive listing of all the rules of the calculus, we restrict the discussion to a subset of the rules and refer the interested reader to (Denney 1997) and (Denney 1998 ) for more details.
One distinctive feature of the calculus is the mutual dependencies of the different syntactic categories, and hence of the different judgement classes. Refinement types can contain propositions, which can contain terms, and these in turn can contain refinement types in the abstractions.
First we describe the well-formedness rules, starting with contexts. The empty context is well-formed, and there are two rules for extending an existing context. Inferring a refinement typing from an equality may seem strange, but it saves us a few rules. The reason for this is that in proving refinement typings and equalities we need to be able to combine assumptions on subterms. Since equalities are subscripted with a refinement type, the rule lets us use equality rules to prove a refinement typing. For example, the congruence rule for abstractions is ?` 0 v ?; x : `t = t 0 ?` x : :t = x: x : 0 :t 0 which lets us prove that n : even:n = even!even n : nat:n, and so we can infer that n : nat:n : even ! even.
The rules for abstractions and pairs have unconventional hypotheses, enabling us to combine logical and typing assumptions.
?; x : `tx :
?` x : :tx = x: t x = 2 t ?` 1 (t) : ?` 2 (t) : 1 (t)=x] ?`h 1 (t); 2 (t)i = x: t
The usual hypothesis for the abstraction rule would be ?`t : x: . The following example makes essential use of this rule.
f : nat ! nat; 8x : nat:even(f x); n : nat`f n : nat f : nat ! nat; 8x : nat:even(f x); n : nat`even(f n) f : nat ! nat; 8x : nat:even(f x); n : nat`f n : even f : nat ! nat; 8x : nat:even(f x)`f = nat!even n : nat:f n ( --EQ) f : nat ! nat; 8x : nat:even(f x)`f : nat ! even Similar examples can be given making use of the rule for pairs.
The refinement rules are of two kinds -'structural' and logical. The interesting rules, however, are for refinement involving propositions. We must say when an arbitrary refinement type is a refinement of a type with a proposition, and when it refines to one.
?` v ?; x : `P ?`(x : )P v ?; x : ; Q`x :
?` v (x : )Q
The only other refinement rule is transitivity of refinement. Finally, there are the rules of the logic. As the idea behind the calculus is that the logic should be orthogonal to the rules of the calculus, we do not list most of the (standard) rules of our example logic, typed classical first-order logic, but just indicate where refinement types are involved. One point is that the contexts are different from the usual formulation. This is made clear by the two introduction rules ?; P`Q ?`P Q ?; x : `P ?`8x : :P
We need a refinement typing for the 8-elimination rule ?`8x : :P ?`t :
? ?`natrec t t 0 (succ n) = succ n] t 0 n (natrec t t 0 n)
The axiom can also be expressed in the standard form of Definition 1. We define iteration from the more general recursion, as natiter t t 0 n = natrec t ( x : nat:t 0 ) n where x = 2 t 0 .
The program is div2 = n : nat: 1 (div2 0 n) div2 0 = natiter h0; 0i ( p : nat nat:h 2 p; 1 p + 1i)
We prove that it satisfies the specification div2 : n:nat (m : nat)n = 2m _ n = 2m + 1 div2 0 : n:nat (m:nat)n=2m_n=2m+1 (m 0 : nat)m + m 0 = n In fact, there is little of interest in the main part of the proof. Since refinement types explicitly indicate the structure of the specification, this enables much of the proof to be carried out in a syntax-directed fashion. This would be useful for automation.
Write n] as an abbreviation for m:(m:nat)n=2m_n=2m+1 (m 0 : nat)m + m 0 = n. The proof continues with n : nat; n = 2 1 p _ n = 2 1 p + 1; 1 p + 2 p = ǹ n + 1 = 2 2 p _ n + 1 = 2 2 p + 1 n : nat; p : n]`n + 1 = 2 2 p _ n + 1 = 2 2 p + 1 n : nat; p : n]` 2 p : (m : nat)n + 1 = 2m _ n + 1 = 2m + 1
The remainder of the proof is arithmetic reasoning. In practice, we would use a theorem prover here.
MODELS
We give interpretations of the calculus in general models, known as Henkin models (Henkin 1950) , with additional per structure. As is usual in concrete models of applied lambda calculi, we must consider such general models in order to get completeness. The per structure is to account for stratified equalities at different refinement types.
We define Henkin models in two stages. First, to each type (not just ground types) we ascribe the set A , and to each constant k : 1 ; : : : ; n ! , an element Const(k) in the set A 1 ::: n! . An applicative structure (with products) is a tuple hfA g; fProj ; 1 g; fProj ; 2 g; fApp ; g; Consti with families of projection and application maps. In addition, we require a function
Pred which interprets predicates
Pred(F ) A 1 ::: n ; for F : pred 1 ; : : : ; n Now, a Henkin Model is an applicative structure with two additional conditions, namely, that it is extensional, and that it satisfies the environment model condition. See (Mitchell 1996) for details. It is extensionality which allows us to interpret abstractions, pairs and the unit uniquely, up to equality in the appropriate per, and the environment model condition which gives enough elements in the model. A Henkin model models an applied theory when all constants and predicates are given an interpretation, and each axiom is true in the model, as defined below.
The idea is that refinement types over type are interpreted as pers over A .
Ground types are interpreted as the identity per over their set. It is easy to see that, in fact, all types are interpreted as identities. Now, expressions are all interpreted in context, so we must first define environments g for context ?, written g ?, where g is a tuple of elements in the domains of the pers for the refinement types in ?. We define this recursively with the interpretation of refinement types and propositions. For per R, we write a 2 R to mean a R a.
hi hi hg; ai ?; x : when g ? and a 2 J?` K(g) g ?; P when g ? and g 2 J?`P K For g; g 0 ? we define equality of environments in the obvious way, as simultaneous equality of elements in the corresponding per, written g J?K g 0 .
To avoid questions of coherence, we interpret raw terms , and so raw propositions and refinement types too. The notation ?`E indicates raw expression E in context ?. Now as mentioned above, refinement types are interpreted as pers over the associated type. The interpretation is given in Figure 1 . The unit and ground types are interpreted as identities; the product and function refinement types are interpreted as the expected combination of pers, and (x : )P is interpreted as the restriction of to the elements for which P holds.
There is an apparent asymmetry in the definition of the product per for x: , but
In fact, only well-structured terms are given an interpretation. For example, ( n : even:n) does not have a well-defined interpretation, but ( n : even:n)3 does, even though it is not syntactically well- The raw term in context ?`t is interpreted in environment g ? as a subset (its 'total realizers') of A . This is given in Figure 2 . The idea is that terms are interpreted as morphisms of pers, that is, maps of equivalence classes, and so the interpretation of a variable is a map from an element to its equivalence class (in the relevant refinement type). It is because of the refinement type in abstractions that we interpret terms as sets rather than as single elements. For example, n : even:n is interpreted as the set of elements in A nat!nat which are the identity for even arguments. In Figure 3 we give the interpretation of propositions. We interpret a raw proposition in context ?`P as the set of environments g ? in which P holds. ? t : when (for all models A) for all g J?K g 0 , for all a 2 J?`tK(g) and a 0 2 J?`tK(g 0 ), we have a J?` K(g) a 0 . In other words, the interpretation is unique up to the equality of the per. We say that ? P when J?`P K = fg j g ?g.
In particular, the refinement ? v 0 is valid when for all g ?, there is an inclusion of pers J?` 0 K(g) J?` K(g). We define ? wf to mean : for all g J?K g 0 , J?` K(g) = J?` K(g 0 ), and ? P wf to mean : for all g J?K g 0 , g 2 J?`P K () g 0 2 J?`P K.
Soundness and Completeness
Having given the meaning to the expressions of the calculus via an interpretation, we must verify that this respects the inference rules, that is, the calculus is sound with respect to the intended interpretation. A consequence of this is that since we can give nontrivial models the calculus is consistent. A more challenging question is whether the calculus is in any sense complete, that is, if a particular judgement holds in all the models (of the relevant signature) then it is provable. In fact, the calculus is also complete, with a couple of provisos. Firstly, due to the way in which well-formedness is combined with satisfying logical properties, we must assume that the judgement is well-formed. This is because it is possible for non well-formed terms to have a unique interpretation, and so, semantically, have a refinement type. For example, ( n : even: )3 is interpreted as the unique inhabitant of unit type, but cannot be typed in the system.
The second point arises with higher-order terms, and is due to the calculus requiring arguments to an abstraction to have the refinement type on the abstraction, but the model just needing equality of arguments at that refinement type to give equal res- . Define the corresponding element in the environment as g x = u] , where u is any total realizer of t (which must exist).
6. For ?`P wf, prove that g 2 J?`P K () 1`P () `P. To prove the first equivalence we directly characterise the interpretation of terms and refinement types in the term model, A. The second equivalence is because for each x : 2 ? 1 , x 6 2 P and is inhabited. Hence A models , and so it models ?. Now since first-order logic, the simply-typed lambda calculus, and the refinement types calculus are all complete for the class of Henkin models, we have The significance of these corollaries is that we are free to use the specification language for proving program equivalences and for reasoning about programs using the program logic, in the knowledge that it faithfully reflects the equality in the underlying programming language, and proofs in the program logic.
CONCLUSIONS
We have described the refinement type methodology of specification. This is a way of combining the type system of a programming language with a program logic to give a specification language. This is an alternative to approaches which rely on encoding a logic into an expressive type theory, and those which simply use a program logic.
The two-level nature of the calculus suggests the construction of a modular tool in which checking program correctness is a combination of type checking and theorem proving. The modularity would come from constructing a 'specification checker' from an existing theorem prover and a type checker, for the program log ic and programming language respectively. Indeed, this is similar to what is done in the interactive proof development systems, Nuprl and PVS.
The calculus could provide a foundation for other specification based formalisms.
In the proof that div2 satisfied its specification we used the proof for div2 0 . There is an implicit element of refinement here. We envisage separate extensions to transformation and refinement calculi, and an embedding in a calculus of full program annotations.
Although we have given a refinement relation v 0 on specifications, this does not constitute a full refinement calculus (such as in (Morgan 1994) ). The idea there is to internalise specifications into programs and consider a refinement relation on mixtures of specification and program. This is carried out in the author's forthcoming PhD thesis. The structure imposed on specifications would help to partially automate verification and derivation.
By extending the type system of ! to refinement types, we gain a simple notion of program annotation, where variables on abstractions are labelled with logical information. The ability to express information within a program context is useful. Program reasoning and manipulation often requires facts which are true at some local program point. For example, if it is known that variable n must be within certain bounds, then a programmer (or compiler) may be able to perform some partial evaluation or optimisation. The ability to express equality at a refinement type is useful in program transformation. For example, we might want to transform a function of type nat ! nat, with the prescription "maintain value on evens, and improve on odds (in some way)". We can express (part of) this by saying that the terms are equal at the refinement type even ! nat.
This account of specifications which brings equality to the fore should be especially useful in data refinement, where it is natural to consider different equalities at the abstract and concrete types.
We believe that the principles outlined here are general enough to be applied to structures other than those traditionally studied -data flow diagrams for example. Since the logic is arbitrary (up to a point) we are not constrained by the type theory. It would be an interesting line of research to see how type-theoretic and semantic ideas could help there. 
